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NOTES
EFFECT OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
ON INHERITANCE TAXATION
In the recent case of In re Ryan's Estate,' it is important to note
the view taken by the North Dakota Supreme Court on the ques-
tion of imposing a state inheritance tax on a non-resident decedent's
interest in land located within this state but subject to an existing
contract for sale. In the above case it was held that the contract
of sale for the realty operated to change the real property into
intangible personality, thus taxable only by the state in which de-
cedent was domiciled. This change was effected by virtue of an
"equitable conversion", and had the effect of excluding decedent's
interest from our statute which imposes an inheritance tax on all
real property situated within thiN state and owned by a non-
resident.
-
In view of the significant consequences of this decision it seems
appropriate to examine the historical background of the doctrine
of equitable conversion and then attempt an analysis of the various
court decisions that have dealt with this problem.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION
Equitable conversion may be defined as that constructive alter-
ation in the nature of property, whereby in equity, real property is
converted into personalty, or vice versa, and is transmissible and
descendible as such.' This doctrine was first clearly stated in the
case of Seaton v. Slade4 where it was said, "The effect of a contract
for purchase of land is very different at Law and in Equity. At
Law the estate remains the estate of the vendor; and the money
that of the vendee. It is not so here. The estate from the sealing of
the contract is the real property of the vendee. It descends to his
heirs. It is devisable by his will; and the question whose it is is not
to be discussed merely between the vendor and the vendee; but
may be discussed between the representatives of the vendee". One
legal writer questions whether or not this doctrine existed prior to
Seaton v. Slade.'
North Dakota formally adopted this doctrine in the case of Clapp
1. 102 N.W.2d 9 (N.D. 1960).
2. N.D. Rev. Code § 57-3703 (1943).
3. Benett v. Bennett, 282 IMI. 266, 118.N.E. 391 (1918);. Hardcastle v .Sibley, 107
S.W.2d 432 (Tex., Civ. App. 1937); Griggs .Land Co. v. Smith, 46 Wash. 185, 89 Pac.
477 (1907).
4. 7 Ves. 265, 32 Eng. Rep. 108 (1802).
5. See 25 Ky. L.J. 166 (1937).
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v. Tower6 where it was stated, "The vendor still holds the legal
title, but only as trustee and he in turn acquires an equitable own-
ership of the purchase money. His property, as viewed by equity,
is no longer real estate, in the land, but personal estate, in the
price; and, if he dies before payment, it goes to his administrator,
and not to his heirs".
The origin of the doctrine is in the maxim that equity looks upon
that as done which ought to have been done.7 However, the courts
generally assert that this doctrine is based solely on a "fiction",8
and will be invoked only when necessary to accomplish justice.9
The doctrine has been subjected to much criticism10 resulting in
modification by statute in some states."
II. GENERALLY
A fundamental limitation upon the power of a state to enact an
inheritance tax is namely that it must have jurisdiction over the
thing taxed.1 2 When a state gives nothing in return for enacting a
tax it may be said that there is no jurisdiction to tax;' 3 therefore a
fundamental question is whether or not the state seeking to impose
the tax has conferred benefit or protection to the property or to
the owner.' It is well established that by virtue of this test, real
property, as such, is subject to inheritance taxation only by the state
where it is located irrespective of the domicil of the decedent.15
However, intangible personalty, the product of the doctrine of
equitable conversion, is taxable by any state which (1) has do-
minion over the converted property,' (2) has dominion over the
6. 11 N.D. 556, 93 N.W. 832 (1903) quoting 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JUR1S'PRU-
DENCE § 105 (5th ed. 1935).
7. See Grayharn v. Grayham, 202 Ala. 56, 79 So. 450 (1918); Lockner v. VanBebber,
364 II. 636, 5 N.E.2d 460 (1936); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1159
(5th ed. 1935).
8. In re Maquire's Estate, 296 N.Y. Supp. 528 (1937); Ins re Foote's Will, 159 Wis.
179, 149 N.W. 738 (1914).
9. State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865 (1922).
10. See Detroit and Security Trust Co. v. Kramer, 247 Mich. 468, 226 N.W. 234 (1929)
(court refused to apply the doctrine where an equitable result would have obtained);
Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 Col. L. Rev. 369 (1913); Pound, Progress of
the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1920); Comment, 37 U. Det. L.J. 258 (1959).
11. See Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract,
44 Yale L. J. 559 (1935).
12. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); State ex rel Peterson v. Dunlap, 28
Idaho 784, 156 Pac. 1141 (1916). See Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919). It
should benoted that in State v. Probate Court, 128 Minn. 371, 150 N.W. 1094 (1915)
the state had power to impose a succession tax in respect to certain property upon which
it could not impose an ordinary tax.
13. See State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
14. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).'
15. People v. Kellogg, 268 Il. 489, 109 N.E. 304 (1915); Succession of Westfeld, 122
La. 836, 48 So. 281 (1909); In re Marrs' Estate, 240 Pa. St. 38, 87 AUt. 621 (1913).
16. State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S.
357 (1939).
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persons whose contract gave rise to the conversion,1 7 or (3) has
extended benefits or protection to the intangible property."' The
necessary result of these rules is that under certain conditions, trans-
fer of intangible personalty is subject to double taxation. 19 However,
many states refuse to impose an inheritance tax on intangible per-
sonal ty owned by a non-resident by virtue of a reciprocity statute. 20
III. INTEREST OF VENDOR
It should be noted that there are two distinct tax situations in-
volving the vendor's interest. First, a state may attempt to tax a
resident vendor's interest in foreign property, in which event opera-
tion of the doctrine of equitable conversion would render the ven-
dor's interest taxable as intangible personalty. 21 Second, the taxing
state may attempt to tax a non-resident vendor's interest in land
located within the state. In this case application of the doctrine
would exempt this interest from being taxed as realty.22 Unfort-
unately we not only have uncertainty in the law as to whether or
not the doctrine of equitable conversion affects the imposition of
an inheritance tax, but the New York courts, prior to De Stue's
Estate, refused to apply the doctrine in the first case, that is, when
the property is in a. foreign state, but felt no apparent compunc-
tion against recognizing and applying the doctrine when the prop-
erty was within the state and its vendor was a non-resident.2 4
Therefore, New York did not collect a tax in either case.
In De Stuer's Estate,25 which brought an end to this inconsistency,
the testator was a non-resident and prior to his death had contracted
to sell real estate located in New York. The court citing the cases
17. Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657, (1942) (A state is not debarred from taxing
a transfer of intangible property by the fact that the transferee must depend in part on the
law of another state to enjoy the benefits of the property).
18. Kelly v. Bastedo, 70 Ariz. 371, 220 P.2d 1069 (1950); Stone v. Stapling Machine
Co., 220 Miss. 470, 71 So.2d 205 (1954); State v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 174 Old.
61, 49 P.2d 534 (1935).
19. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) (Intangible property may be subject to
double taxation without violating the U.S. Constitution).
20. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. State, 348 Mo. 725, 155 S.W.2d 107 (1941); City
Bank Farmer's Trust Co. v. New York Cent. R. Co., 253 N. Y. 49 (1930); Ins re Eiler-
mann's Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P.2d 763 (1934) (These statutes provide in effect
that personal property of a non-resident decedent otherwise subject to a tax shall be en-
titled to an exemption providing the law of decedent's residence grant a similar exemption
to citizens of this state). See In re Miller's Estate, 239 Wis. 551, 2 N.W.2d 256 (1942).
21. State v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155, 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Briebach's
Estate, 132 Mont. 432, 318 P.2d 223 (1957) (here a reciprocity statute barred the tax);
Ins re Plasterer's Estate, 49 Wash. 339, 301 P.2d 539 (1956).
22. In re Ryan's Estate, 102 N.W.2d 9 (N.D. 1960); Its re Eilennaa's Estate, 179
Wash. 15, 35 P.2d 763 (1934).
23. In re Walcott's Estate, 157 N.Y. Supp. 268 (1916); Ins re Baker's Estate, 124 N.
Y. Supp. 827 (1910).
24. In re Russell's Estate, 194 N.Y. Supp. 837 (1922); In re Boshart's Estate, 177 N.
Y. Supp. 574 (1919).
25. 99 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1950).
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of Connell v. Crosby2l and In re Wilson's Estate,2 7 held that an in-
heritance tax could be imposed by New York on the vendor's in-
terest in the real estate asserting that, "The doctrine of equit-
able conversion concerns only those who have come into relations
of contract or privity with the decedent or his estate,"" and as
the state is a stranger to the contract the doctrine is inoperative.29
The court also stated that determination of ownership depends
upon the quantum of vendor's interest in the land after execution
of the contract.2 0 The quantumn of vendor's interest should be de-
termined by weighing a variety of factors. The courts contend that
subsequent to execution of the contract and until an actual con-
veyance is made the vendor retains legal title to the premises." In
addition thereto, the law confers upon him a vendor's lien.32  In
event of default the vendor may institute an action to cancel the
contract as a cloud on his title, thus retaining the land unencumber-
ed .3 Indication of the vendor's power over the land is also found
in the fact that he can, while the contract is still in force, convey
complete ownership of the land to a bona fide purchaser who re-
ceives the land without notice of the contract. 34  Moreover the land
may be sold upon execution to satisfy a judgment levied againt
the vendor.35 Finally the vendor may maintain an action for waste
against the vendee in possession if v6ndor's security is impaired. 6
Moreover, it has been intimated that the vendor is still liable for
the unlawful use of the property and is responsible for injuries aris-
ing from such use.37  Thus it is apparent that the vendor under a
contract for the sale of real property retains substantial interest in
that property and in New York his interest is great enough to give
him substantial ownership meriting taxation. Along with New
York, the state of Illinois refuses to apply the doctrine, but on a
somewhat different basis. Illinois contends that this doctrine is
26. 210 Ill. 380, 71 N.E. 350 (1904).
27. 218 Iowa 368, 255 N.W. 489 (1934).
28. Hooper v. Peters Mineral Land Co., 210 Ala. 346, 98 So. 6 (1923); Its re De
Stuer's Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1950).
29. Quoting from the case of Matter of Baker, 124 N.Y. Supp. 827 (1910).
30. See also State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
31. See Seirnler v. Beulah Coal Min. Co., 48 N.D. 1011, 188 N.W. 310 (1922);
Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (1931).
32. Charles v. Scheibel, 218 N.Y.S. 545 (1926); Connors v. Winans, 204 N.Y. Supp.
142 (1924). See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1263 at 773 (5th ed.
1935).
33. Kitching v. Browne, 197 N.Y.S. 441 (1922); Charlton v. Sheil, 158 N.Y. Supp.
944 (1916).
34. See Macauley v. Smith, 132 N.Y. 524, 30 N.E. 997 (1892); Pollock v. Viele, 76
N.Y.S.2d 904 (1948).
35. Schmidt v. Steinbach, 193 Mich. 640, 160 N.W. 448 (1916); Wells v. Baldwin,
28 Minn. 408, 10 N.W. 427 (1881).
36. Moses v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517, 7 So. 146 (1890). See Miller v. Waddingham, 91
Cal. 377, 27 Pac. 750 (1891).
37. See Baker's Estate, 124 N.Y. Supp. 827 (1910) (dicta).
NOTES
recognized in equity alone, and is not given effect in courts of law;
therefore, it cannot be applied in proceedings for the collection of
inheritance taxes which are actions at law.3" Pennsylvania also
refuses to recognize a change in the nature of property by virtue of
an equitable conversion, contending that jurisdiction to tax is one
of fact, and cannot turn upon theories or fiction, which have no
place in a well adjusted system of taxation. 9
The majority of states which have decided on this issue hold that
upon execution of a contract for deed, the doctrine of equitable
conversion operates to change the interest of the vendor from that
of real property to intangible personalty.10 It is said that the ven-
dor retains only the naked legal title in the real estate as security
for payment of the purchase price.4' Some cases compare the ven-
dor's interest to that of a mortgagee on the basis the parties oc-
cupy substantially the position of mortgagor and mortgagee.4 2 Thus
the vendor or his heirs have in substance a chose in action for the
unpaid purchase price or choses in action for the various install-
ments if the contract of deed so provides and his interest, as such,
is intangible personal property.13  Moreover, the vendor has no
power to devise or sell the real estate which is the subject of the
contract of sale.4 4
In Paurs Estate,45 the dissenting opinion aptly pointed out that
the contract does not "stand for" the land, i. e. serve as a substitute
for the land, but the contract derives its value from the ability of
the vendee to pay. Thus if the land was sold for $100,000.00 and
became worthless, the vendor's property in that contract would still
be worth $100,000.00. The vendor looks first to the ability of the
vendee to pay and then to his property. Such being the case, this
property is not any "make believe" legal fiction, but is an economic
and legal fact.
IV. INTEREST OF VENDEE
If the true nature of the vendor's interest in the contract of sale
38. Connell v. Crosby, 210 ill. 380, 71 N.E. 350 (1904).
39. Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (1931).
40. State v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155, 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Briebach's
Estate, 132 Mont. 437, 318 P.2d 223 (1957); In re Plasterer's Estate, 49 Wash. 339, 301
P.2d 539 (1956).
41. See In re Wiley's Estate, 150 Neb. 898, 36 N.W.2d 483 (1949); Corp. v. Klind-
worth, 77 N.D. 597, 44 N.W.2d 417 (1950); Clapp v. Tower, 11 N.D. 556, 93 N.W.
862 (1903).
42. See D.S.B. Johnston Land Co. v. Whipple, 60 N.D. 334, 234 N.W. 59 (1931).
Contra City of Marquette v. Michigan Iron and Land Co., 132 Mich. 130, 92 N.W. 934
(1903).
43. In re Plasterer's Estate, 49 Wash. 339, 301 P.2d 539 (1956). See dissent in Paul's
Estate, 303 Pa. 330 154 Atl. 503 (1931).
44. William v. Board of Commissioners, 84 Kan. 508, 114 Pac. 858 (1911).
45. 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (1931).
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for real property can be said to be "personalty," then, a fortiori,
the interest of the vendee from the same moment becomes "realty".
The arguments advanced by the courts in support of their particular
theory, as to whether an actual change in the nature of the vendor's
interest occurs, should apply with equal force here.
However, it is interesting to note that although the great majority
of courts assert that the doctrine of equitable conversion operates
immediately upon execution of a valid and enforcible contract, 46
the cases which apply the doctrine in the field of taxation do so only
if vendor has transferred substantial "beneficial" interest in the
property to the vendee. A preview of the cases indicates that the
doctrine is applicable to inheritance taxation only if the vendee is
in possession of the property or entitled to immediate possession.4 7
Some courts have maintained that the intention of the parties as to
when transfer of the land actually occurs should determine the
moment of conversion, and that the court acts in accordance with
the presumed intention.4" It has been suggested that in a contract
for the sale of land, no general rule can be more than an attempt
to follow the intention of the parties; and that when "by the contract
the beneficial incidents of ownership are to pass is the time which
the parties must regard as the moment of transfer".49 Courts apply-
ing the doctrine of equitable conversion to determine if an inheri-
tance tax should be imposed, should distinguish cases which do not
apply the doctrine by pointing out that in these cases the vendor,
and not the vendee, has the right to possession of the land by the
terms of the contract.
V. CONCLUSION
The operation of an equitable conversion when the beneficial
incidents of ownership are transferred to the vendee seems to be
the better rule as it has the effect of imposing payment of an in-
heritance tax on real property to the party that enjoys or has the
right to enjoy the "fruits" of ownership over the property. Uni-
versal adoption of this rule would also have the desirable effect
of eliminating the imposition of double taxation on the non-resi-
dent decedent's interest in land subject to a contract for sale.
LYLE CARLSON.
46. In re Bernhard, 134 Iowa 603, 112 N.W. 86 (1907). See Rockland-Rockport Lime
Co. v. Leary, 203 N.Y. 469, 97 N.E. 43 (1911).
47. State v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155, 176 N.W. 493 (1920); In re Stuer's Estate,
99 N.Y. Supp 739 (1950); Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (1931).
48. Baker v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 253 Mass. 130, 148 N.E. 593
(1925). See 4 Mont. L.Rev. 93 (1943).
49. Williston, The Risk of Loss after an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law,
9 Harv. L. Rev. 106, 120 (1885).
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